Where policy ends are contested and means for change are ambiguous, imposing central targets on local organisations what we call hierarchist governance is problematic.
Introduction
Targets are used in many health systems to focus managerial attention on priority areas for improvement and, by providing an explicit standard for evaluation, to promote accountability for results (Wismar et al., 2008, Smith and Busse, 2010) . However, the top-down imposition of targets by central government on local organisations has attracted criticism (Carter, 1989, Bevan and Hood, 2006) . This form of governance by targets what we call hierarchist governance requires dials (Carter, 1989) : accurate measures of performance which unambiguously represent desired policy ends (Bevan and Hood, 2006) and whose means of attainment are available to the organisations under scrutiny (Jacobs et al., 2006) . For many issues in health policy, however, goals are contested and means for change are ambiguous. For such wicked problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973) , performance indicators are mere tin openers : measures which do not give answers but prompt interrogation and inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate picture (Carter, 1989, p. 134).
The concept of experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) suggests that when the correct targets and means for change are ambiguous, targetsetting should rather be conceptualised as a learning process between central and local organisations. However, the relationship between experimentalist and hierarchist governance is still unclear (Fossum, 2012) . The wider performance management literature has questioned the extent to which measurement for learning and improvement can be fostered alongside demands for accountability for results (Freeman, 2002) , suggesting these logics are incompatible. This study, in contrast, examines the potential for complementarity of hierarchist and experimentalist governance, in the sense that they align and add value to each other. We investigate two research questions:
1. Can hierarchist and experimentalist elements co-exist and complement each other in the same healthcare target system? 2. Does the relative emphasis on experimentalist as opposed to hierarchist logics differ between policy issues depending on the degree of perceived ambiguity over ends and means?
This study contributes to knowledge as follows. First, we examine a system (the Scottish HEAT target system) whose socio-historical context is favourable to any potential complementarity between hierarchism and experimentalism. As McDermott et al. (2015) suggest, a precondition for such complementarity includes long-standing collaborative relationships between central and local organisations within a hierarchically administered health system. As we describe in section 3.1., the Scottish HEAT target system meets these conditions. Second, we follow-up on Sabel and Zeitlin s hypothesis that experimentalism will evolve for policy issues whose ends and means are ambiguous. In turn, where ends and means are relatively clear, a more hierarchist approach may serve to foster common standards of practice. While existing research has shown between-country differences in target-based governance , Blackman et al., 2009 , Bevan, 2010 , we find that within-country variations in governance style exist at the level of policy issues.
The next section contrasts theoretical assumptions underpinning hierarchist and experimentalist governance, reviews the rationale for exploring the scope for complementarity between them, and highlights potential barriers to complementariy. In the empirical analysis, we compare the development of targets for two policy issues in the Scottish HEAT target system. Implications for policy and research are discussed.
Theoretical and policy background

Setting targets: Hierarchist versus experimentalist governance
Drawing on principal-agent theory, hierarchist target-setting (Table 1) became a key policy instrument under New Public Management reforms pursued in various countries since the 1980s (Hood, 2007) . It is vividly illustrated by the model of targets and terror (Bevan and Hood, 2006) were subject to strict performance targets with severe consequences for failure. (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012, p. 170) .
Experimentalist governance was developed to understand how multilevel governance structures in uncertain and heterogeneous contexts can improve performance. This includes complex regulatory settings such as child protective services (Noonan et al., 2009 ) and policy-making in the European Union on areas such as social protection, telecommunications, drug and food safety where the interdependency of member states, the European Commission and other stakeholders often precludes formal rule-making (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008, Fierlbeck, 2014) . )n these contexts the increasing use of open norms broad objectives and high level regulatory principles) reflects the need to avoid clear and precise rules in order to deal with regulatory uncertainty (Hocepied and de Streel, 2005) .
Why explore the scope for complementarity between hierarchist and experimentalist governance?
Complementarity implies that certain entities (here, logics of target-setting) come together in a synergistic way. Since each logic retains its essential characteristics, complementarity is thought to enable a broader spectrum of policy responses (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013) and to balance the limitations of a single model only (Goddard et al., 2000) . Below we review key limitations of hierarchist governance with respect to target-setting, implementation, and accountability. We highlight why experimentalism may offer an effective complement but not necessarily a substitute.
With regard to target-setting, where ideal ends of policy are contested, experimentalist governance scholars claim that argument offers a better basis for decision-making than authority (Pires, 2011). Because local organisations have an insight into frontline problems that national oversight bodies lack, it is argued that global and local knowledge are mutually corrective, not hierarchically ordered (Sabel, 2004, p. 181) . However, insofar as governments have a legitimate mandate to define priorities (Mays, 2006, Smith and Busse, 2010) , the experimentalist proposal of joint target-setting seems to contradict existing lines of accountability between government and subordinate administrations. Thus, while the engagement of local stakeholders, as called for by experimentalist governance, may be a valuable or even an essential strategy to develop targets for wicked problems it may not be desirable to abandon hierarchist stewardship of the system entirely.
Where means for implementation are ambiguous, the hierarchist approach provides no process how to achieve targets. Consequently, local organisations tend to develop various coping strategies (Lawton et al., 2000) but there is not necessarily an attempt to share learning across contexts. Experimentalist governance addresses this limitation by promoting local experiments and mutual exchange about different approaches taken, so as to identify and scaleup good practice (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) . However, where effective interventions are known or become clearer over time (e.g. after a period of deliberative learning), regulatory authorities can codify and enforce common standards of practice, subject to dynamic revision. Hierarchist regulation thus retains a key role (Eberlein 2010 ).
In terms of accountability, the hierarchist view of accountability for results implies the need to comprehensively specify goals. Since most public services have multiple goals, incomplete contracts combined with divergent interests and informational asymmetries risk encouraging gaming by local organisations (Bevan and Hood, 2006) and misinterpretation of complex local production processes by regulators (Smith, 1995) . In search of complete contracts, reforms in England and the Netherlands have led to a multiplication of quantitative indicators so as to cover every aspect of performance thereby overwhelming the capacities of central and local organisations (Power, 1999 , Pollitt et al., 2010 . Experimentalism, in contrast, is seen to limit the need for a variety of indicators since it strives to understand how targets are implemented (Noonan et al. 2009; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) . Nevertheless, within a publicly funded health system, ignoring demands for accountability for results in efforts to improve performance seems unrealistic .
The above review suggests that hierarchist and experimentalist governance have different potential strengths and limitations with respect to target-setting, implementation and accountability. Thus, there is a strong rationale to explore the scope for complementarity between them.
Barriers to complementarity
Is complementarity between hierarchist and experimentalist governance empirically feasible? The wider healthcare performance management literature has tended to argue that measurement for improvement (which underpins experimentalist governance) ought to be kept separate from measurement for accountability for results (which underlies hierarchist governance). While the former is thought to require a culture of openness, using data that is good enough to diagnose and remedy problems, the latter is premised on a culture of judgment against fixed objectives, with a consequent need for accurate data (Solberg et al., 1997 , Freeman, 2002 , Davies, 2005 .
Such incompatibility of both logics, in the sense that regulators adopt either one or the other logic, but not elements of both, seems to be supported by empirical research on health targets. An international review of health targets in seven European nations found that target-setting styles differed in terms of their focus on either hierarchist regulation and accountability, or more deliberative, learning-oriented stakeholder engagement . The findings showed struggles in bringing these elements together: some nations fostered stakeholder consensus, but failed to achieve accountability (e.g. Germany,
Flanders) while others established strong regulatory frameworks focussed on accountability for results yet omitted local ownership (e.g. England) .
However, it is not known to what extent these findings reflect a general incompatibility between these approaches to target governance, or specific features of the health systems examined.
Methods
System context and study design
Scotland offers a suitable context to examine experimentalist governance ideas within a hierarchical system. The planning and delivery of health services is delegated to 14 territorial NHS Boards who are responsible for £10.9 billion (of £11.9 billion Government spending on health in 2012/13; Audit Scotland (2013). But while NHS Boards are major budget-holders and have considerable powers to shape patterns of service delivery, they remain directly accountable to Scottish ministers and subject to central constraints such as the requirement to break even in each financial year (Steel and Cylus, 2012) .
The model of governance of the Scottish NHS immediately after devolution in 1999 has been described as one of trust and altruism since local organisations were trusted to deliver a high-quality service (Bevan et al., 2014) . Ministers have long eschewed targets or rankings that inflict reputational damage, rejecting top-down performance management in favour of a consensual approach with local managers and clinical leaders (Greer, 2004) . The relational distance between central and local organisations is low (Hood, 2007) To examine the balance between hierarchist and experimentalist logics contingent on the nature of the policy issue (our second research question), we compare the development of HEAT targets for two policy issues. These policy issues were selected based on two criteria. The first criterion was to represent opposite ends on a spectrum of ambiguity over goals and means (Table 2) .
 For the case of healthcare-associated infections (HAI), where both ideal performance and the means for change were relatively well-known when targets were introduced, one would expect a more hierarchist logic.
 For the case of shifting the balance of care for older people (SBC), where both the ideal ends and the means for change were ambiguous, one would expect a more experimentalist logic.
Table 2 about here
The second criterion for selecting these two policy issues is methodological:
Targets were introduced in 2006 (SBC) and 2008 (HAI) and have evolved since then, thus enabling a comparison of their development over time.
Data collection and analysis
The study triangulates multiple sources of data (Table 3) . Interviewees were recruited following a purposive strategy (Patton, 2002) intended to (i) capture national and local experiences and (ii) represent diverse local contexts. We started with an initial group of national and local managers and, using snowballing , invited 33 people for interview. We included Boards from rural and remote areas (e.g. Highlands) and urban areas (e.g. Lothian); small Boards (e.g. Shetland, with a population of less than 20,000) and large Boards (e.g.
Glasgow, with a population of over 1 million); and Boards who performed comparatively well and poorly on targets for the two policy issues, since we expected these aspects to potentially influence the perception of targets.
In total, 31 interviews were conducted between June 2014 and February 2015
(two people declined due to time constraints), audio-recorded and transcribed.
We considered data saturation to be achieved when no new themes emerged after a couple of further interviews (Guest et al., 2006) . Participants were informed about the aims of the study, encouraged to ask questions and assured of the anonymity of their responses. The first author s institutional review committee granted ethics approval.
Based on the theoretical constructs from hierarchist and experimentalist governance, directed content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) was used.
This enabled theory triangulation as each case was examined through different theoretical lenses (Patton, 2002) . The first author collected and analysed the data (using NVivo). The second author supervised this process and, through regular discussions, contributed to the iterative refinement of the interpretations. To mitigate against misinterpretation, we shared the findings with the interviewees who were asked to point out any factual errors. 
Findings
The next sections analyse the HEAT target system and special features in the governance of HAI and SBC. Specifically, we investigate how approaches to target-setting, implementation and accountability, introduced above, reflect hierarchist or experimentalist logics (for a summary, see Table 4 ). problems (reflecting the experimentalist logic).
Implementation
The HEAT target process is led by a Directorate in the Scottish Government which agrees local delivery plans (LDPs) with each Board and monitors progress against these. In LDPs, Boards explain how they plan to attain the HEAT targets and the risks they face. A head of performance noted that LDPs are a way to sensecheck with the Scottish Government and raise concerns we see locally . This reflects the experimentalist logic insofar as LDPs may serve as a mechanism to help uncover local problems and management strategies.
Nevertheless, LDPs are drafted in relation to national guidance and signed-off by the Government. Interviewees perceived LDPs primarily as the contract between Government and Boards, reflecting a hierarchist orientation.
Accountability
The HEAT target system has institutionalised two routes to assure accountability. One is a summative assessment that reflects the hierarchist logic of accountability for results. The Government examines progress against the LDPs at Annual Reviews. In addition, biennial Accountability Reviews are held by ministers where members of the public can ask questions. These reviews result in a letter from the Cabinet Secretary about issues Boards are expected to address. National progress against the HEAT targets is reported publicly on the Target values, however, were derived from technical information rather than consensus; reflecting hierarchist ideas. Initially, targets aimed at a 30 percent reduction of HAIs over a five-year period. This was based on a seminal study on the prevention of nosocomial infection in the United States (Haley et al., 1985) which had found that a third of hospital infections was avoidable with a defined set of interventions including surveillance, having trained infection control staff, and a system for reporting infection rates to practising surgeons. Following consultations with Boards, the HAI Taskforce thus agreed on the roughly 75th percentile of the distribution of HAI rates as the minimum target.
Those performing better were expected to continue to improve to prevent regression towards this minimum target.
Implementation and accountability: the challenge of communityacquired infections
Since Boards have integrated responsibility for acute, primary and community care, the national target includes all cases of HAI regardless of where they have been acquired. 
Conclusion
The perception of HAI as an issue where national standards where both feasible and desirable resulted in centrally determined targets; reflecting a hierarchist orientation. Nevertheless, Boards were consulted and their feedback was acted upon in the specification of target values. This implies the experimentalist concept of joint target-setting between central and local organisations.
Implementation has focused on the more hierarchist notion of standardised interventions. However, the reframing of the boundaries of the problem from hospitals to the wider community led to more learning-oriented approaches to implementation and accountability. This can be interpreted as a partial transformation towards experimentalism. Experimentalism would suggest that setting targets through dialogue requires a mutual interest in obtaining challenging yet feasible targets. Since HEAT targets are publicly reported and frequently cited to underpin political achievements, one would expect the Scottish Government to have an interest in targets that can be met. However, emergency care puts increasing strain on the NHS budget and rising demand due to demographic changes challenges the Government s pledge to protect universal coverage (Barbour et al., 2014) . This has led to a perception that the situation is unsustainable and there is a real need to reorient health services (Government official), suggesting a commitment to move beyond merely symbolic targets. The incentive for Boards to identify a credible trajectory was, according to our respondents, both improved patient experience and financial sustainability, which is heavily scrutinised by ministers, Audit 
Some Boards seemed very ambitious (...) but some also had an ambitious improvement programme so the trajectory was backed up (...) it was a lot about
speaking to Boards (Scottish Government official).
Implementation and accountability
Fundamental problems in SBC and initial differences to HAI were the limited evidence of effective interventions, local diversity and Boards partial ownership of targets. These differences appeared to influence the approaches to both implementation and accountability. Local managers we interviewed noted that these case studies were increasingly valued as offering inspiration rather than prescription -for local action.
Conclusion
Shifting the balance of care for older people was from the outset recognised as an issue of local diversity and uncertainty about effective interventions. As a result, governance focussed on Board-specific targets, innovative models of care and local partnerships, and attempts to share learning. This approach reflects core principles associated with experimentalist governance.
Discussion
Prompted by the limits of a hierarchist approach to setting targets for policy issues whose ideal ends and means for change are ambiguous, we have examined whether complementary use of hierarchist and experimentalist ideas is possible.
Returning to our research questions, the findings suggest the following. First, hierarchist and experimentalist elements can be shown to exist in the same performance management regime (Table 4) . Experimentalism adds distinct aspects to target-setting, implementation, and accountability that are missing from a purely hierarchist approach (Table 1 ). In Scotland, this has led to a system where: central and local actors contribute to setting targets; central bodies support local attempts to implement change; and local actors are held accountable both for processes and for results. This suggests a complementary role of experimentalism (Fossum, 2012) . Nevertheless, there is also some evidence of tension between the logics. This is illustrated by the ambivalent perception of Government performance support teams with their dual mandate for central control and local support.
Second, while both logics co-existed at the HEAT system level, their relative emphasis differed between policy issues and also over time within a policy issue. Where targets were informed by the vision of an optimal balance between community and hospital care and means for change were ambiguous (care for older people; Table 2 ), governance styles reflected experimentalist ideas more strongly. Where ends and means were known initially (HAI; Table 2), targets followed a more hierarchist logic. When the rise of community-acquired infections decreased clarity about effective interventions, the ideal level of HAI (zero) and the model for target-setting remained constant. However, a more learning-oriented approach to implementation and accountability ensued (Table 4 ). This can be interpreted as a partial drift in governance style to the experimentalist realm (Figure 4) .
Figure 4 about here
The main implication of these findings is that the distinct combination of governance logics can be adapted on a target-by-target basis. Thinking of hierarchism and experimentalism as a property of the performance management system as a whole may be analytically too coarse (from a research perspective) and neglect opportunities that arise from drawing on both logics (from a policy perspective). As this study shows, it is important to look deeper at differences between policy issues and at dynamics over time.
Our study setting, the Scottish HEAT target system, was chosen explicitly because we expected it to be receptive to complementarity between hierarchism and experimentalism. Its socio-historical and administrative context is characterised by longstanding collaboration between central and local organisations alongside a well-developed central-local accountability relationship (McDermott et al., 2015) . Our finding that it is possible to combine experimentalism and hierarchism may thus not be easily transferable to systems which do not meet these conditions. In countries where administrative competencies are dispersed between actors, hierarchist target-setting is less likely to play a key role and an experimentalist governance logic may be the only feasible approach to set targets at all. In turn, however, experimentalism is likely to flourish only if it is possible to develop the infrastructure and willingness to encourage local freedom to innovate, with requisite financial and managerial support, and then share experiences across the system. Overall, our findings highlight the need for policy and research to reconsider the strict separation between measurement for improvement and measurement for accountability (Solberg et al., 1997 , Freeman, 2002 , Davies, 2005 . The experiences from Scotland lead us to conclude that both purposes can co-exist within a system. Setting targets does not have to end up in targets and terror but may combine stakeholder engagement with accountability for results. This is an important contribution to existing research which found the hierarchist approach to target-setting, focussed on accountability for results, and the learning-and engagement-oriented approach to target-setting, which reflects experimentalist ideas, in separate countries but not in the same system . We have shown that the nature of policy issues and changes therein over time are important conditions for synergies between governance logics.
Future research might further explore the enabling conditions for and outcomes of combining multiple logics of target governance within different institutional contexts. 
Tables and Figures
Target-setting
Central government has a legitimate mandate to set targets for subordinate administrations.
Knowledge about goals is contested, provisional and distributed between central and local actors. Therefore, target-setting should be a joint process between central and local actors.
Ambiguity about means:
Implementation of targets
 Means for change are available to local agents.
 The state designs contracts, incentivising agents to meet the targets and controlling the effects of asymmetric information about the effort of agents.
 Means for change are ambiguous.
 The state provides support, encourages mutual learning and spread of good practice.
Accountability
Inspection of results and application of rewards and punishments.
Inspection of validity of processes: frontline organisations review and explain the choices they make for running a programme.
Sources authors display based on Sabel and Zeitlin
Pires (2011). Service redesign complex and little evidence (Johnston et al., 2008) Reduce the rate of emergency inpatient bed days for people aged 75 and over per 1,000 population, by at least 12% between 2009/10 and 2014/15 Targets are revised after a three-year cycle.
Target values were set centrally, reflecting a hierarchist orientation.
Target values were developed through dialogue, reflecting an experimentalist orientation.
Implementation
LDPs are negotiated as contract between Government and Boards.
LDPs serve to identify risks and management strategies locally.
National guidance defines standards for local action, reflecting a hierarchist orientation.
With the rise of CA-HAIs: Emphasis on dialogue and networks to share good practice, collaborative research and involvement of community health professionals, reflecting an experimentalist orientation.
Local innovation was funded through the Change Fund and is increasingly shared through case studies, reflecting an experimentalist orientation.
Accountability
Target achievement is assessed at Annual Reviews and publicly reported.
Diagnostic monitoring throughout the year serves to identify and remedy problems.
With the rise of CA-HAIs: Emphasis on root-cause analysis and inspection of local clinical processes reflecting an experimentalist orientation.
Figure 1 Ambiguity over goals and means in relation to governance style
